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Frye Remains the Standard for Determining the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Pennsylvania
Courts: Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
EXPERT TESTIMONY - STANDARD FOR ADMITING EXPERT TESTIMONY
INTO EVIDENCE - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that expert
testimony, in accordance with the Frye rule, must be generally
accepted in the relevant scientific field to be considered as
evidence, and that the federal practice of including expert
testimony under more relaxed principals would not be followed in
Pennsylvania courts.
Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000)
On September 15, 1980, Jeffrey Blum was born with a crippling
condition known as bilateral clubfoot defect.' During the course of
her pregnancy with Jeffrey, Mrs. Blum took the drug Bendectin,
manufactured and marketed by Merrell Dow, to help relieve the
nausea associated with morning sickness. 2  The company
maintained that Bendectin was a safe and effective means of
controlling nausea during pregnancy and that the drug had no
known adverse affects on either the mother or fetus.3 The Blums
however, disagreed and averred that Mrs. Blum's ingestion of
Bendectin during pregnancy was the proximate cause of Jeffrey's
iury.4
1. Brief on Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants Blum at 3, Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
705 A-2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (No. 3711 Philadelphia 1995). Clubfoot defect is a
deformity of the foot (or feet) that occurs from a malformation of the bones of the forefoot
during a fetal development. MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH DIcrIoNARY
(Kenneth N. Anderson, et al. eds., 4th ed. 1994). Generally, the deformity manifests itself as a
foot that is twisted inward and upward resembling a club, hence the name "clubfoot." Id.
Treatment, depending on the severity of the condition, can range from splints and casts to
numerous surgical procedures over an extended time. Id.
2. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 194 (1996). Mrs. Blum's
attending physician prescribed the drug based on representation made in the Physician's
Desk Reference, which indicated that human and animal studies showed no association
between Bendectin and fetal anomalies. Id. at 237-38.
3. Id. at 194 (referring to a speech given by James Newberne, Vice-President for Drug
Safety at Merrell Dow, to the Maternal Advisory Committee of the Food and Drug
Administration regarding the safety and efficacy of Bendectin). Id.
4. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 626 A.2d 537, 538 (Pa. 1993) ("Blum I").
Proximate cause is defined as the primary cause producing injury, without which the injury
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Mr. and Mrs. Blum sued Merrell Dow on behalf of their child and
in their own right for the injuries allegedly caused by Bendectin.5 In
1986, the trial resulted in a $2 million award for the plaintiffs.
6
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately vacated
the decision.7 The case was retried in 1994 in the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County and the jury returned a unanimous
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for over $24 million.8
Following the jury's decision, Merrell Dow sought a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict ("j.n.o.v.") 9 on the grounds that the
plaintiffs' expert testimony was scientifically inadequate and should
not have been presented at trial.10 The trial judge disagreed and
denied the defendant's motion for j.n.o.v., from which the defendant
appealed."
The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, concluding that the
plaintiffs' evidence did not satisfy the Commonwealth standard set
forth in Frye v. U.S.,2 requiring expert testimony to have the
general acceptance of the relevant scientific community before
being entered as testimony.
3
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which noted that expert evidence was arguably admissible under
the less stringent federal standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 4 known as the Daubert test. 5 The
would not have occurred. BLACK'S LAw DICMONARY (6th ed. 1991).
5. Appellants' Brief at 3, Blum (No. 3711 Philadelphia 1995).
6. Blum, 33 Phila at 195.
7. Blum I, 626 A.2d at 549. Merrell Dow argued that the verdict, delivered by an
eleven-member jury after one juror became ill, was a violation of its constitutional right to a
trial by jury. Id. at 538. The supreme court agreed and vacated the decision, remanding the
case for a new trial. Id. at 549.
8. Blum, 33 Phila. at 196. The Blums were awarded $200,000 for medical expenses;
$4,000,000 for pain, disfigurement, and emotional distress; $15,000,000 in punitive damages;
and $4,918,147 in delay damages, resulting in a total award of $24,118,147. Id.
9. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a judgment rendered in favor of one party
despite a verdict in favor of the other party. BLACK'S LAW DIcToNARY (6th ed. 1991).
10. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 705 A-2d 1314, 1315-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
11. Id. at 1315-16. In addition to challenging plaintiffs' expert evidence with respect to
causation, Merrell Dow raised five issues on appeal relating to jury instructions. Id. On
appeal, the superior court, however, addressed only the sufficiency of causation evidence
and reversed on this issue alone. Id. at 1325.
12. 293 F 1013 (App. D.C. 1923). In Frye, the Court concluded that results from
systolic blood pressure deception tests (lie detector tests) could not be admitted as expert
evidence because the tests had not gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community. Id. at 1014.
13. Blum, 705 A.2d at 1325. This standard is known as the Frye test. Id. at 1317.
14. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (involving an allegation by plaintiffs that their children's birth
defects resulted from the ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy). Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
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court agreed to review the case to decide whether the Daubert test
should supercede the traditional Frye analysis used in Penn-
sylvania.16 In a 5-2 decision, the court refused to reject the Frye
analysis based on the facts in Blum, and ultimately affirmed the
superior court's decision in favor of Merrell Dow."7
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Flaherty stated that Frye,
adopted in the Commonwealth in 1977,18 excludes novel scientific
evidence not having the general acceptance of the relevant
scientific community.19 In contrast, Flaherty noted that Daubert
permits evidence not generally accepted within the scientific
community, but only if a judicial inquiry shows the evidence to be
both relevant and reliable - a standard the majority believed to be
less stringent than Frye.20 Despite outlining the differences in the
tests, the court placed weight on the parties' willingness to frame
their arguments in terms of the traditional test, and was therefore
content to affirm Frye as the standard for admissibility of expert
testimony.21 In fact, the majority remarked that the details of the
case actually precluded them from deciding whether Daubert
should become the new standard in Pennsylvania.
22
When reviewing the lower court decisions, the majority examined
the credibility of plaintiffs' causation evidence, as presented by
expert witness Dr. Alan Done.23 The court concluded Dr. Done's
The trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs' evidence of
causation did not have the general acceptance of the scientific community, and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 583-84. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded because federal judges must admit expert testimony showing scientific reliability
and relevance to the issues at bar, regardless of general acceptance within the community.
Id. at 597-98. On remand, the appellate court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F3d 1311, 1322 (Ca. 9th Cir. 1995).
15. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa 2000) ("Blum IF).
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id. at 4-5.
18. Pennsylvania officially adopted the Frye standard in Commonwealth v. Topa, 369
A.2d 1277 (Pa 1977), which held that voiceprint analysis could not be used as evidence
against a defendant because it lacked general acceptance within the field of acoustical
science. Id. at 1282.
19. Blum II, 764 A.2d at 2-3.
20. Id. at 2-3. In a footnote, the Chief Justice cited an amicus brief of the Pennsylvania
Defense Institute, charging that, although relatively simple, the Frye test results in greater
consistency and predictability than does Daubert. Id. at 4, n.4.
21. Id. at 3-4.
22. Id. at 4. The majority considered the testimony insufficient to satisfy either
standard. Id.
23. Id. at 4 n.5. While plaintiffs did offer evidence regarding the positive correlation
between Bendectin ingestion and birth defects, Dr. Done was the only witness to testify as to
a direct causal relationship between the drug and Jeffrey Blum's birth defect. Blum I, 705
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proof was based on a methodology not usually accepted by the
scientific community and, moreover, represented a backward
approach to science.2 4 The court questioned not only Dr. Done's
methodology, but his conclusions and reputation as well,
characterizing Dr. Done as a "professional plaintiff's witness."25
Chief Justice Flaherty pointed out that, in over thirty published
reports relating to Bendectin, no study found any causal connection
between Bendectin and birth defects. 26 Moreover, a review of the
research by the Food and Drug Administration also failed to show
the requisite causal connection.27 The majority decided that the
testimony of Dr. Done was insufficient to satisfy either standard,
and therefore, no adequate grounds existed to evaluate the wisdom
of a change from Frye to Daubert.
28
Justice Cappy, the first of two dissenting justices, agreed that
Frye should remain the standard of review.29 However, he
expressed concern over apparent misapplications of law in the
superior court's opinion.30 According to Justice Cappy, a critical
issue not addressed by the majority was whether the superior
court's classification of Frye as a two-pronged test would mislead
lower courts.
31
The superior court opinion stated that, in addition to
methodology, an expert must also show that his conclusions satisfy
the general acceptance standard of Frye.32 Justice Cappy agreed
that an expert's methodology must conform to the standard, but he
disagreed with the proposition that expert conclusions had to be
generally accepted; he feared that such an inflexible test would
prevent properly conducted research from being heard, simply
A.2d at 1316.
24. Blum II, 764 A.2d at 4 n.5.
25. Id. (referring to the characterization of Dr. Done in Lust v. Merrel Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 89 F3d 594, 597 (9th Cir., 1996)). The majority cited a number of examples from various
federal courts criticizing Dr. Done and his professional competence and motivations. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Blum II, 764 A.2d at 4.
29. Id. at 5 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
31. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice Cappy noted that Pennsylvania has historically
required judges to evaluate the methodology behind a scientific principle to ensure that it
meets the general acceptance test; however, according to Cappy, only one decision,
McKenzie v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 674 A.2d 1167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996), imposed the
additional requirement of general acceptance of conclusions - an expansion of Frye that
has never been formally accepted by the supreme court. Id. at 5 (Cappy, J., dissenting). See
infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
32. Blum I, 705 A.2d at 1322-23.
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because it was new.3 For this reason, Justice Cappy stated that he
would flatly overrule the superior court's decision requiring Dr.
Done's conclusions to have general acceptance within the scientific
community before admissibility under Frye.14
Justice Cappy also noted a fair amount of conflict in the record
over exactly what standard the trial court had applied in deciding
the case. 35 Given the confusion, Justice Cappy questioned how the
superior court reached its conclusion without completing its own
Frye analysis of the facts, and thereby overstepping the bounds of
an abuse of discretion review. 6 Given his view that the trial judge
is best positioned to serve as the "gatekeeper" of good science in
the courtroom, Justice Cappy advocated remanding the case for a
new trial.
37
Justice Castille, also dissenting, agreed with the majority that
Frye remains the standard in Pennsylvania.3 However, he disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the trial judge incorrectly
applied Daubert,39  and remarked that the plaintiffs proved
causation under Frye - namely because Frye only required a
consensus with respect to expert methodology, not expert
conclusions.4 0
Noting the different applications of Frye available to the court,
Justice Castille criticized the majority for failing to state exactly
33. Blum 11, 764 A.2d at 5 (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice Cappy commented that
analyzing Frye questions only in terms of whether the methodology conformed to generally
accepted scientific beliefs was sufficient to prevent questionable science from entering the
courtroom while still allowing new, properly drawn conclusions to be presented to the jury.
Id.
34. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice Cappy remarked that the trial court claimed to
have properly applied Frye, the superior court declared that the trial court improperly
applied Frye, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded Daubert was applied instead
of Frye at the trial level. Id. at 5-6.
36. Id. at 6 (Cappy, J., dissenting). "Abuse of discretion" is the standard that an
appellate court uses to determine whether a lower court made a clearly erroneous
conclusion based on the facts of a case. BLAcK's L.Aw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1991).
37. Blum II, 764 A-2d at 6 (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice Cappy remarked that the
"gatekeeper" role - keeping junk science out of the courtrooms through careful examination
of the proffered expert testimony - was in the exclusive province of the trial judge and
should not be left to appellate judges. Id. at 5-6.
38. Id. at 6 (Castille, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 7 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille stated that the trial court was
keenly aware that the application of Frye can be confusing; the trial court endeavored to
explain its rationale while weighing facts that did fit neatly within the traditional application
of frye due to Merrell Dow's extensive presence in the Bendectin research community. Id. at
7. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
40. Id. at 9 (Castille, J., dissenting).
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what standard it employed when completing its analysis.4'
Following a traditional Frye analysis, requiring only a general
consensus with respect to methodology, 42 Castille concluded that
the record was sufficient to show that Dr. Done's testimony had the
general acceptance of the scientific community.
43
When examining the facts with respect to the plaintiffs' expert's
methodology, Justice Castille commented that the methodology
itself was not questioned by the superior court.44 Rather, it was the
expert's analysis of the data that the court found to be lacking.45
Justice Castille rejected the superior court's approach on the
ground that it precluded any conclusion other than that of the
original researcher, and therefore was flawed.46 He observed that
both the plaintiff and defendant relied on the same basic data, but
accounted for different factors in analyzing that data, thereby
arriving at different conclusions. 47 The conflicting conclusions
represented nothing more than a classic battle between the experts,
which was appropriately resolved by a jury.
48
In his opinion, Justice Castille also criticized the majority for
relying on extraneous information to impeach the plaintiffs'
expert. 49 He charged the majority with selectively citing unrelated
cases in order to support the assertion that Dr. Done was a
"profession plaintiffs' witness,"50 when, in fact, similar criticisms
41. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
42. Blum 11, 764 A.2d at 9 (Castille, J., dissenting). Castille stated that he would flatly
overrule previous decisions requiring expert evidence to be admitted as long as the
methodology alone met the standard of general acceptance. Id.
43. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 14 (Castille, J., dissenting). The methodologies used involved: analysis of the
drug's chemical structure to determine if the molecular makeup of the drug made it
.suspect;" in vitro studies analyzing the effect of Bendectin on animal cells; in vivo studies
analyzing the effect of Bendectin on live animals; and recalculation of human
epidemiological studies. Blum I, 705 A.2d at 1320.
45. Blum II, 764 A-2. at 15 (Castille, J., dissenting). The superior court remarked that
Dr. Done's "recalculation" of the evidence was outside the general acceptance of the
community because he failed to control for biases through standardization of the data. Blum
1, 705 A.2d at 1324.
46. Blum 11, 764 A.2d at 16 (Castflle, J., dissenting). Castille pointed out that a variety
of studies relied upon by the defendant did not contain standardized data. Id. at 15-16.
Moreover, the defense experts also employed the same type of recalculation methodology as
Dr. Done and admitted that such analysis could produce reliable scientific data. Id. at 16.
47. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 16 (Castille, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 10 (Castille, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Castille argued that many of
the cases cited by the majority to support their conclusion regarding Dr. Done's reliability
were insufficient to support this line of reasoning. Id. at 11 n.7. In fact, only one case cited
by the court actually expressed concern over Dr. Done's impartiality. Id.
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could be made about the defendant's witnesses.51 Justice Castille
remarked that the majority's reliance on unrelated cases, instead of
the record, was inappropriate and resulted in an inaccurate
opinion, especially given Merrell Dow's apparently influential
presence within the Bendectin community.
52
Justice Castille questioned the defendant's influence over the
science involved.5 He suggested that it indicated that a potential
bias within the research community existed to give the defendant
the ability to create a scientific orthodoxy that precluded any
minority opinions from ever entering the court.54 With this in mind,
Justice Castille remarked that, even if Frye ultimately required the
trial court to analyze both methodology and conclusions for general
acceptance, the Blum case was unique and should give rise to an
exception allowing minority testimony where it is shown that the
research community in question is potentially biased towards one
party.
55
For centuries, courts have struggled with the challenge of
defining what constitutes acceptable scientific evidence in the
courtroom.56 Until the early part of the twentieth century, courts
generally permitted an expert to testify at trial, provided that he
had appropriate credentials and the evidence presented would
likely help the jury.57 In 1923, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized the need
for a new standard governing admissibility and addressed the issue
51. Blum II, 764 A.2d at 10-11 (Castille, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 11 (Castille, J., dissenting). Castille noted that a large part of the Bendectin
research, which was purported to be objective, revealed a potential proprietary link between
the researchers and the defendant Id. Merrell Dow employed Dr. Brent, the defendant's lead
witness and an influential researcher in the Bendectin community, for eighteen years. Id. Dr.
Brent was also an editor for the peer review journal which published studies relating to the
Bendectin/birth defect relationship, and was noted to have submitted articles to Merrell Dow
attorneys for their approval prior to allowing a piece to be published. Id. In addition, the
record showed that Merrell Dow manipulated data, underreported evidence of
malformations, relied on flawed research when reporting to the FDA, hid research from the
FDA, paid for research studies directly from the defense budget, and employed experts who
actively solicited funds in exchange for research. Id. at 12-14.
53. Id. at 14 (Castilie, J., dissenting). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
54. Id. (CastUle, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 16-17 (Castille, J., dissenting). Castille noted that, "[t]here is something not a
little offensive about an entity creating a biased, litigation-driven scientific 'orthodoxy,' and
then being permitted to silence any qualified expert holding a dissenting view on ground of
'unorthodoxy.'" Id. at 17.
56. David L Faigman et. al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please:
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific




in Frye v. United States.58
In Frye, a defendant convicted of murder attempted to prove his
innocence by introducing evidence based on a systolic blood
pressure deception test.59 The lower court refused to admit the
evidence and, on appeal, the court of appeals endeavored to define
the correct standard for gauging the admissibility of expert
testimony.60 Justice Van Orsdel, writing for the majority, noted that,
to be admissible, the evidence proffered must have general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community. 61 Given that blood
pressure testing to show deception was novel and not accepted by
the community, the court found the evidence to be inadmissible,
and precluded the defendant from relying on it.
62
The standard set forth in Frye has been widely accepted and
used throughout the United States.63 Prior to the Frye decision,
Pennsylvania generally admitted expert testimony as long as the
witness could show that he was an expert in the area, and the
testimony was needed to clarify issues not within the general
knowledge of the jury.6 However, around the 1950's, Pennsylvania
began showing a trend towards the adoption of Frye.65
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court moved closer to the Frye
standard in Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth, in which
Nicholas Riccio was convicted of robbery.6 The defendant asked
the court to order a polygraph test to help prove his innocence, but
58. Frye, 293 F at 1013.
59. Id. at 1013-14. The systolic blood pressure deception test was an early form of
polygraph testing. Deborah Maliver, M.D., Note, Out of the Fryeing Pan and Into Daubert:
Thal Judges at the Gate Will Not Spell Relief for Plaintiffs, 56 U. Prrr. L REV. 245, 247
(1994). The defendant-appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and tried to
introduce favorable results from a lie detector test. Frye, 293 F at 1013-14. On appeal, the
court of appeals noted that the test operated on the premise that lying, combined with fear
of detection during examination, produces a rise in blood pressure above that attributable to
simple anxiety brought on by the examination process itself. Id.
60. Frye, 293 F at 1013-14.
61. Id. at 1014. Specifically, the court said that, "the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs." Id.
62. Id.
63. Leonidas Pandeladis, Comment, Frye and Daubert: Does Pennsylvania Need a
Different Evidentiary Standard for Scientific Evidence?, 36 DuQ. L REv. 597, 599 (1998).
64. Cooper v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 186 A. 125, 128 (Pa. 1936).
65. James E. Starrs, Conference Proceeding, The Duquesne University School of Law
Institute for Judicial Education's and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's Conference on
Science, and the Law: Recent Development in Federal and State Rules Pertaining to Medical
and Scientific Expert Testimony, 34 DUQ. L REv. 813, 815 (1996).
66. 115 A.2d 865, 866 (Pa. 1955).
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the request was denied, and he appealed.67 The crux of the
defendant's argument was that lie detectors had advanced to the
point of general acceptance and should be admissible;68 however,
the majority disagreed and affirmed the trial court's decision to
deny the request.69 Citing Frye, the supreme court indicated that
the reliability of such tests was not sufficiently established to
warrant inclusion as evidence, but nonetheless stopped short of
adopting the general acceptance test set forth in Frye.v0
Not until the landmark decision of Commonwealth v. Topa, in
1977, did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court squarely address the
issue of adopting Frye as the standard for admissibility in the
Commonwealth.7' In Topa, the Commonwealth relied on evidence
generated by spectograms to convict the defendant of murder.72 On
appeal, one question the supreme court confronted was whether
the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to present
expert testimony on spectography.7 3 In his analysis, Justice Jones
acknowledged the credentials and opinion of the Commonwealth's
witness, but confirmed that other scientists in the field had not
67. Riccio, 115 A.2d at 866. The court noted that the defendant staunchly maintained
his innocence and asked for a lie detector test to provide some generalized evidence as to
the truth of his statements. Id. Justice Ross, however, did not believe that the test had
evolved to the point where it could provide more than speculative evidence as to a
defendant's guilt or innocence, despite the defendant's assertions to the contrary. Id. at
866-67.
68. Id. The court commented that the question of the reliability of lie detector tests
was not squarely before the court because the defendant was not attempting to admit
evidence based on such tests. Ricchio, 115 A.2d at 866. The question, rather, was whether
the trial court erred when it refused to order the test that could present some generalized
evidence as to the defendant's innocence. Id.
69. Id. at 867.
70. Id. at 866-67.
71. 369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977). The defendant in Topa was convicted of first-degree
murder. Topa, 369 A2d at 1278. The case against the defendant consisted of circumstantial
evidence including: testimony from witnesses identifying the victim's clothing and the
defendant's clothing; the defendant was seen driving past the crime seen on the day the body
was found; blood on the defendant's jacket matched the victim's blood; and a missing button
from defendant's jacket was found at the scene. Id. at 1279.
72. Id. at 1279-80. A spectrogram is an instrument for analysis of voiceprints (which
the court likened to fingerprints) as a means of identifying speech patterns to determine if
an individual placed a particular call. Id. at 1280.
73. Id. at 1278. The Commonwealth's witness regarding spectography was a police
officer in charge of a Voiceprint Identification Unit operated by the Michigan State Police. Id.
at 1279. The officer had extensive training in voiceprint analysis, was in charge of the Unit
for six years prior to the case, and firmly believed in the reliability of spectography. Id. at
1280.
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found the technology as reliable as did the testifying officer.74 The
court then remarked that, to be admissible, the evidence must be
founded on more than just opinion.75 Rather, Frye should be
strictly applied and evidence must be generally accepted in the
scientific community for admissibility.76  Accepting this new
standard, the court remarked that the Commonwealth's evidence
could not stand, and reversed the defendant's conviction,
remanding for a new trial.
77
Decisions after Topa illustrate the Commonwealth's continuing
dedication to the Frye standard of general acceptance.78 For
example, in Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, a witness, after being
hypnotized, claimed to recall details about a murder79 The trial
court refused to allow the testimony, and on appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved whether hypnotically
refreshed testimony was sufficiently reliable so as to have the
general acceptance of the scientific community.80 Justice O'Brien
noted that, after the Commonwealth adopted Frye in 1977, expert
testimony had to meet the requisite standard of having the general
acceptance of the relevant scientific community prior to being
admitted as evidence.8' Given that many researchers speculated
about the reliability of memories evoked through hypnosis,82 the
74. Id. at 1280. The court pointed out a number of criticisms of voiceprint analysis,
including comments that the test is more susceptible to extraneous factors and allegations
that mimicry and intentionally altering one's voice could cause false results. Id. at 1280-81.
75. Id. at 1281.
76. Topa, 369 A.2d at 1282.
77. Id.
78. See Commonwealth v. Apollo, 603 A.2d 1023, 1024 n.3, 1028 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(holding that results of a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, which tested sobriety by eye
movements, were inadmissible under the Frye standard). See also Checchio v. Frankford
Hosp., 35 Pa D. & C. 4th 143, 161-62 (1998) (holding that Frye required an expert witness to
produce objective evidence that reduced oxygen to the minor plaintiffs brain while
hospitalized was the proximate cause of the child's neurological dysfunction).
79. 436 A.2d 170, 173 (Pa 1981). The witness in Nazarovitch claimed to have
nightmares about the murder of a 12-year-old girl and thought she might know something
about the crime. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d at 171. Police had interviewed the witness
previously, but she had not provided any useful information about the crime. Id. Following
her visit to the police station, officers arranged for the witness to see a hypnotist, which
ultimately led the witness to recall details of the murder sufficient to indict three individuals
for the crime. Id. at 172.
80. Id. at 171, 173.
81. Id. at 172-73.
82. Id. at 174. The court pointed to several problems with hypnotically refreshed
testimony, including the witness's desire to satisfy the hypnotist, susceptibility to suggestive
influences, and the possibility that the witness will simply "fill in the gaps with fantasy. Id.
at 174.
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majority determined that the hypnosis evidence was insufficient to
satisfy the general acceptance rule and precluded adnission of the
witness' testimony.83
Despite the apparent simplicity of Frye,84 the Pennsylvania courts
recently addressed various issues with respect to its application of
Frye, as is manifest in Dambacher v. Mallis.85 In Dambacher, the
plaintiff was injured when the driver of the car she was riding in
lost control, allegedly as a result of radial and non-radial tires being
used on the same car.s6 The trial court permitted the plaintiff to
produce an expert to testify as to the adverse consequences of
mixing the two types of tires, and on appeal, the Superior Court
answered the question of the requisite showing that an individual
must make in order to be qualified as an expert for purposes of
Frye.8 7 The superior court noted that, to be qualified as an expert,
the witness must show a degree of experience and education
encompassing the specialized issue at trial. 88 The plaintiffs expert,
although an expert mechanic, lacked expertise in tire design, study,
or manufacture, and was therefore incapable of providing expert
testimony regarding a causal connection between the tires and the
accident.8
In addition to clarifying the definition of "expert," Pennsylvania
has also decided what constitutes "general acceptance" within the
Commonwealth, as explained in Commonwealth v. Middleton.9° In
Middleton, the defendant was convicted of robbery and murder.91
During the trial, the Commonwealth relied on scientific testimony
that linked the dried blood found at the scene to the defendant;
however, the defendant contended that the Commonwealth failed
to show general acceptance under Frye because only one witness
was called to testify as to the reliability of the blood testY2
83. Id. at 178.
84. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Pennsylvania Defense Institute in Support of Appellee,
at 23. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (No. 3711
Philadelphia 1995), (referring to the "undeniable simplicity" of Frye). Id.
85. 485 A-2d 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
86. Dambacher, 485 A.2d at 411.
87. Id. at 411.
88. Id. at 418.
89. Id. at 420.
90. 550 A.2d 561 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
91. Middleton, 550 A.2d at 562. The defendant tried to rob the victim, but when she
resisted, he dragged her into an alley and beat her severely, which ultimately resulted in her
death. Id.
92. Id. at 565. The prosecution's witness was a serologist who testified as to the
reliability of electrophoresis, a type of blood testing used to identify blood samples. Id. at
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On appeal, the superior court addressed whether a single witness
presented by the Commonwealth to testify as to the reliability of a
certain type of blood testing was sufficient to show general
acceptance. 93 The court declared that the Frye standard is met
provided that the expert's testimony is not merely based upon
subjective opinion alone, but instead reflects the general
acceptance in the scientific community, as evidenced by published
scientific studies.94 Because both judicial and scientific authorities
recognized the reliability of the test, the fact that only one witness
testified as to the test's reliability did not undercut its possible
general acceptance in the scientific community.
95
Pennsylvania further refined Frye's application in Commonwealth
v. Dunkle,96 confronting whether expert opinions regarding the
behaviors of abused children should be admissible testimony when
such behaviors were readily understood without the assistance of
an expert.97 Writing for the supreme court, Justice Cappy explained
that in order to be admissible, expert testimony must not only have
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs, but
must also involve subject matter "beyond the knowledge or
experience of the average layperson."98 Because many of the
behaviors attributed to abused children could easily be understood
by jurors, the court stated that an expert witness was unnecessary
and held that the testimony could not be admitted as evidence. 9
Recently, in Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, the supreme court again
revisited the issue of who may testify as an expert for purposes of
a Frye inquiry.'°°  The question in Miller was whether a
565. The witness testified that, based on published scientific studies and on his own
experience, electrophoresis is generally accepted as reliable technology among experts in
forensic serology. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 565-66.
95. Id. at 566.
96. 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992).
97. Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 831, 838. The case also concerned the general admissibility of
evidence of "Child Abuse Syndrome," which reflects an attempt to profile behaviors of
sexually abused children and to use such profiles as a diagnostic tool. Id. at 832. The court
refused to allow such general testimony on the grounds that the "syndrome" was not
generally recognized among the doctors treating the children, and lacked specificity in
identifying sexually abused children as opposed to other types of abused children. Id.
98. Id. at 836.
99. Id. at 839.
100. 664 A.2d 525 (Pa. 1995). The plaintiff in MiUer claimed that the defendant bar
owner's act of serving alcohol to an intoxicated patron and then permitting him to drive was
the proximate cause of the patron's death in a subsequent vehicular accident. Mi/er, 664
A.2d at 526-27.
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non-physician coroner with 27 years experience was qualified to
render expert testimony regarding the time of death.10 1 Justice
Montemurro, writing for the majority, remarked that the test to
determine a witness' qualifications is "whether the witness has any
reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject
under investigation."10 2 Despite that the coroner did not have a
medical degree, the court stated that his experience as a licensed
mortician and county coroner were sufficient to constitute
specialized knowledge for the purposes of expert testimony, and
permitted the testimony.103
In addition to the above clarifications of the rule, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also struggled with ascertaining
whether an expert's conclusions or methodology need general
acceptance in the scientific community.1°4 In Commonwealth v.
Crews,'°5 the defendant was convicted of the brutal murder of two
hikers along the Appalachian Trail. 1 6 The defendant raped one of
the victims, and the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence
supporting a match between the body fluids found in the victim
and those of defendant. 10 7 At trial, an expert for the Commonwealth
testified that the defendant's DNAI°a patterns generally matched the
DNA patterns obtained from the raped victim, but he did offer any
statistical analysis to refute the possibility that the match was
simply a coincidence. 1°9 The defendant countered by attempting to
introduce evidence as to the statistical analysis of DNA sampling,
101. The court precluded the plaintiff's expert witness from testifying as to the time of
death because the coroner was not identified as an expert in pre-trial interrogatories and
was not a medically trained doctor. Id. at 527. Because the plaintiff was unable to establish a
time of death, the court ruled that no causal connection was established, in favor of the
defendant. Id.
102. Id. at 528.
103. Id. at 529.
104. See Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere & Craig L. Thorpe, Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence Under Pennsylvania Law: An Excursion Through the Frye Test, 71 Pa. Bar Assn.
Quarterly 103 (2000).
105. 640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994). The victims were killed at an overnight shelter on the
Appalachian Trail. Crews, 640 A.2d at 396. One victim had been tied, raped, and stabbed in
the neck, which resulted in her death after approximately fifteen minutes. Id. at 397. The
other victim was shot three times with a revolver, and died five to eight minutes after the
wounds were inflicted. Id.
106. Id. at 396-97.
107. Id. at 397. See supra note 105.
108. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the molecule that carries human genetic
information. MOSBY'S MEDIAL, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH DIcTIONARY (Kenneth N. Anderson,
et al. eds., 4th ed. 1994).
109. Crews, 640 A.2d at 397.
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but the lower court refused to allow the evidence. 1" 0
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was called upon to
determine the admissibility of evidence based on DNA analysis."'
The court, acknowledging Frye as the applicable rule, accepted the
proposition that the broad concept of DNA testing is generally
accepted in the field of human genetics,"' but declined to admit
any evidence based on statistical analysis of DNA data because the
process of drawing conclusions from the DNA analyzed evidence
had not achieved widespread acceptance within the scientific
community. 3 Therefore, the majority refused to overturn the
convictions and affirmed the lower court decision.1
4
Similarly, in McKenzie v. Westinghouse, the Commonwealth
Court encountered the issue of expert testimony's admissibility
under Frye if the methodology employed by the expert has
achieved general acceptance, but the conclusions reached have
not." 5 The court stated that, to be admissible, the scientific
conclusions propounded must reflect more than a single expert's
opinion or the opinions of a small number of the scientific
community in question." 6 It was not enough that the methodologies
employed are generally accepted." 7 Rather, the conclusions reached
by the expert are required to be generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community." 8 Because a general consensus did not exist
with respect to the witness's conclusions, the court refused to
110. Id. at 399. The prosecution was permitted to testify that DNA analysis of the
samples taken from the victim were "extremely strongly associated with the DNA from the
defendant." Id. at 402. The defendant sought (and was denied) admission of statistical
evidence to contradict this testimony and show that the match could have been a product of
coincidence. Id. at 401-02. Ultimately, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree
murder. Id. at 397.
111. Id. at 396. The circumstantial evidence presented included: possessions belonging
to the victims found in the defendant's possession; the handgun the defendant possessed was
identified as the weapon that killed one victim; a knife found on the defendant had the
second victim's blood on it; and a variety of witnesses placed the defendant at the scene at
the time of the murders. Id. at 397.
112. Id. at 401.
113. Id. at 402. The court viewed the problem to be that statistical analysis was subject
to too many variables, including race, ethnicity, population samples, etc. Id. at 401.
114. Crews, 640 A.2d at 407.
115. 674 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1996). In McKenzie, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's use
of the chemical trichloroethylene (TCE) ultimately contaminated groundwater, resulting in a
fatal heart defect in their infant daughter. McKenzie, 674 A.2d at 1168. The trial court
excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony on the grounds that the relevant scientific
community did not commonly accept the opinion that TCE causes heart defects. Id. at 1170.
116. Id. at 1171 (citing Middleton, 550 A.2d at 561).
117. Id. at 1172.
118. Id. (citing Topa, 369 A.2d at 1277).
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allow the testimony.11 9
On the heels of Crews and McKenzie, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decided Commonwealth v. Blasioli.20 The defendant in
Blasioli was accused of rape, and the prosecution introduced
statistical evidence to show a one in ten billion chance that the
DNA in question came from anyone other than the defendant.121
The court once again resolved whether testimony regarding DNA
statistical testing could be admitted as evidence.'2 Justice Saylor,
writing for the majority, acknowledged that both an expert's theory
and the technique employed must meet the general acceptance
standard of Frye.'2 However, despite the lack of consensus
regarding statistical testing in previous years, developments in the
relevant field had yielded the consistent opinion that the statistical
method employed in Blasioli had gained general acceptance.
124
Therefore, statistical analysis of DNA could properly be admitted as
evidence under Pennsylvania's application of Frye.1
25
Despite Pennsylvania's adherence to Frye, some of the state's
courts have criticized the doctrine as ineffective at keeping junk
science out of the courtroom. 26 Moreover, various commentators
have even questioned whether Frye provides a workable standard
to gauge the admissibility of evidence. 27 Criticisms of Frye include
the lack of consistency in defining which witnesses qualify as
expert and what is needed to show general acceptance;'2
inaccurate suppression or admittance of testimony;' 29 and difficulty
in defining what scientific discipline is implicated.1' °
119. Id. at 1172-73.
120. 713 A.2d 1117 (Pa. 1998).
* 121. Blasioli, 713 A.2d at 1118. Blasioli was convicted and sentenced to four to eight
years imprisonment for the rape and six to twelve months on remaining charges. Id. at 1119.
The Superior Court affirmed. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1119.
124. Id. at 1125. The court noted subsequent events that indicated that the debate over
the science had resolved and was in fact supported by respected scientific literature, and
was recognized by the weight of judicial authority. Id. at 1125-26.
125. Blasioli, 713 A.2d at 1127.
126. See Quaker City Hide Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 10 Phila. 1 (1985) (referring to
Frye as a standard with burdens far outweighing any benefits available). Id. at 11.
127. See generally Pandeladis, supra note 63, at 615 (advocating the use of a more
liberal approach to the admissibility of evidence within the Commonwealth Courts).
128. Edward V. DiLello, Note, Fighting Fire With Firefighters: A Proposal For Expert
Judges at the Trial Level, 93 Colum. L Rev. 473, 475-76 (1993).
129. Scientific Evidence Symposium, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence - An
Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L REv. 545, 552-53 (1984).
130. Daniel E. Fisher, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: The Supreme Court
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Proponents of the standard, however, claim that Frye is the best
method to assure that only good science is heard in the courtroom,
minimizing the risk that a jury will be swayed by pseudo-science.1'
3
In addition, advocates of Frye also laud the test as the most
consistent and objective approach to defining expert testimony. 32
Regardless, much controversy exists over whether Frye provides a
workable standard for judging the reliability of scientific
evidence.3
Because of these questions surrounding the relative value of
Frye, courts around the country, including those in the federal
system, have abandoned it in favor of the test set forth in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.13 In Daubert, the United States
Supreme Court decided whether Frye bound the federal courts.
35
The Court concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs
the admissibility of expert testimony, and is interpreted to allow
expert testimony provided it is both reliable and relevant to the
issue at bar.'3 With this the Court declared Frye inapplicable
within the federal system and adopted a new standard for judging
the admissibility of science in the courtroom.137 The case was
remanded for evaluation of the evidence in light of the new
standard pronounced by the Court.'13
Pennsylvania, of course, is not bound by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and in 1998 adopted a codified system covering the rules
of evidence, with section 702 defining the rules of admissibility of
any expert testimony. 39 Section 702 states that expert testimony is
permitted provided that: (1) the subject at issue requires knowledge
beyond that possessed by the general layperson; (2) the testimony
will help the trier of fact to understand evidence or resolve a
factual issue; and (3) the testimony is proffered by a witness with
the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to
Gives Federal Judges the Keys to the Gate of Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony,
39 S.D. L REv. 141, 150 (1994).
131. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Pennsylvania Defense Institute in Support of Appellee
at 22. Blum (No. 3711 Philadelphia 1995).
132. Id. at 23-24.
133. See generally Maliver, supra note 59.
134. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 585.
136. Id. at 590-91.
137. Id. at 597.
138. Id. at 597. Ultimately, the trial court excluded the evidence on the grounds that it
was scientifically unreliable. Id. at 1322.
139. PA.R.E. 702.
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qualify as an expert in the field.140
While it may appear as though the Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence also supercede Frye, the comments following section 702
declare that the adoption of a codified system of evidentiary rules
did not alter Pennsylvania's adherence to the Frye standard.'4 ' In
fact, the Pennsylvania Superior Court explicitly clarified this point
in Tagliati v. Nationwide Insurance Company by confirmed that
Frye continues to govern in Pennsylvania, and that the
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence are to be read in light of existing
case law.42 However, the problem is that Pennsylvania's application
of Frye has allowed for inconsistencies in the case law, especially
regarding whether conclusions, methodology, or both need the
need to be generally accepted.'"
Interpreting Pennsylvania's requirements for Frye has proved
problematic, as demonstrated in the supreme court's opinion in
Blum. The majority opinion seems to adhere to the proposition that
both methodology and conclusions need to have general
acceptance for an expert to testify,'" but the court does not
expressly state whether it is applying this approach in the case. On
the contrary, the dissenting justices object to the proposition that
an expert's conclusion must also conform to the Frye standard. 45
The confusion reflected in Blum points to the conclusion that this
area of the law needs to be clarified by the supreme court. Indeed,
other commentators have asked the court to reconcile the
discrepancies and set forth the actual standard that should be
employed.'"
With recent advances in technology, it seems that science will
continue to enter into the courtroom in an ever-increasing fashion.
To effectively settle the issues raised regarding the value of an
expert's opinion, a consistent, articulable standard needs to exist to
which the courts can easily adhere. Blum may not have been a
suitable case for assessing the need for a change in admissibility
standards; however, Blum was certainly an adequate vehicle for the
court to clearly enunciate what Frye requires. Given the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 720 A.2d 1051 & n.4 (Pa. 1998).
143. Iheukwumere, supra note 104, at 108.
144. See Blum II, 764 A.2d at 4 n.5 (illuminating the criticism of Dr. Done's conclusions
by other courts). Id.
145. Id. at 5, 9.
146. Iheukwumere, supra note 104, at 108.
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importance of expert testimony, it is unfortunate that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court missed this opportunity to clarify the
law in an area that requires its attention.
Kristie Kline
